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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects of transitory increases in government spending when
public debt is used as liquidity by the private sector. Aggregate shocks are introduced
into a exible-price, incomplete-market economy where heterogenous, innitely-lived
households face occasionally binding borrowing constraints and store wealth to smooth
out idiosyncratic income uctuations. Debt-nanced increases in public spending fa-
cilitate self-insurance by bond holders and may crowd in private consumption. The
implied higher stock of liquidity also loosens the borrowing constraints faced by rms,
thereby raising labour demand and possibly the real wage. Whether private consump-
tion and wages actually rise or fall ultimately depends on the relative strengths of the
liquidity and wealth e¤ects that arise following the shock.
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Introduction
This paper analyses the e¤ects of transitory scal expansions when public debt is used as
liquidity by the private sector. We conduct this analysis in an incomplete-market model
where agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk and cannot borrow against future
income (i.e., markets are liquidity-constrained in the terminology of Kehoe and Levine,
2001, amongst others). Non-Ricardian models of this type have on occasion been used to
analyse the aggregate and welfare e¤ects of public debt in the steady state (see Woodford,
1990; Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998).1 To date, there have been surprisingly few attempts
at clarifying how such economies respond to aggregate scal shocks. One important contri-
bution is Heathcote (2005), who o¤ers a quantitative assessment of the impact e¤ect of tax
cuts. In this paper, we attempt to characterise analytically the impact and dynamic e¤ects
of public spending shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
The spending shocks of which we analyse the e¤ects have one signicant, and realistic,
feature: they are at least partly nanced by government bond issues in the short run, with
public debt then gradually reverting to some long-run target value thanks to future tax
increases.2 Note that whether public spending is nanced by taxes or debt does not mat-
ter in complete markets, Ricardian economies with lump-sum taxation, because households
discounted disposable income ows are identical between alternative modes of government
nancing. Then, under reasonable assumptions about preferences and technology, the nega-
tive wealth e¤ects associated with transitory spending shocks lead to falls in the demand for
both private consumption and leisure, which in turn produces a drop in the real wage (e.g.,
Baxter and King, 1993).
The decit nancing of spending shocks can, however, have very di¤erent consequences
1Other important applications of the liquidity-constraint paradigm to macroeconomic issues include
Bewley-type monetary models (e.g., Bewley, 1983; Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986), models of capital ac-
cumulation with precautionary savings (e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett, 1997), models of business cycles with
heterogenous agents (e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1998) and asset-pricing models with borrowing constraints
and short-sales constraints (e.g., Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Krusell and Smith, 1997).
2For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) document a limited impact response of taxes to spending
shocks in the U.S., implying decit nancing in the short run. Bohn (1998) established that the U.S.
debt-GDP ratio is mean-reverting thanks to the corrective action of the primary surplus.
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when public debt is used as private liquidity, that is, as a store of value held by agents
for precautionary, or self-insurance, purposes. Starting from a situation in which private
liquidity is scarce (in a sense that we specify below), such policies have the side e¤ect of
increasing the stock of liquidity available in the economy, thereby facilitating self-insurance
by bond holders and e¤ectively relaxing the borrowing constraints faced by households and
rms. As we show, the liquidity e¤ects associated with rising public debt tend to foster house-
holdsprivate consumption demand, along with the labour demand of borrowing-constrained
rms. Whether and when such liquidity e¤ects may o¤set wealth e¤ects, and thus overturn
the predictions of the Ricardian model regarding the e¤ects of spending shocks on private
consumption and wages, is the central theme of this paper.
It is perhaps surprising that the actual impact of our scal experiment is still subject
to so much empirical controversy. In particular, the application of di¤erent identication
strategies to U.S. data has either supported the Ricardian prediction of a fall in private
consumption and wages following an increase in public spending (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998;
Ramey, 2008), or come to the opposite conclusion that both variables actually increase after
the shock (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2007), which latter is consistent with
the Old Keynesian model and with a version of the New Keynesian model endowed with a
su¢ cient number of market imperfections (Gali et al., 2007). Given this lack of consensus,
our goal here is not to take any denitive position as to whether an adequate scal policy
model should generate pro- or counter-cyclical responses of those variables to public spending
shocks. Rather, we use our model to illustrate that both outcomes are theoretically possible
(and not implausible quantitatively) depending on the relative strengths of the liquidity and
wealth e¤ects that arise following the shock. As we show, which e¤ect actually dominates
crucially depends on how quickly the scal rule followed by the government ensures the
reversion of public debt towards its long-run target following the initial scal decit. If taxes
rise promptly after the increase in public spending, then public debt will not vary very much
and liquidity e¤ects will be weak; in this situation, wealth e¤ects are likely to be dominant
and private consumption and wages will fall. If, on the contrary, the slow reaction of taxes
leads to a substantial growth of public debt in the short and the medium run, then liquidity
e¤ects maybe strong enough to dominate wealth e¤ects and private consumption and wages
will rise. Overall, temporary increases in public spending are all the more e¤ective at raising
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output that the simultaneous response of taxes is limited.3
The market incompleteness-cum-borrowing constraint assumption is the only departure
from the frictionless Ricardian framework considered here, the other aspects of our model
remain fully standard in a stripped-down form. In contrast to several recent contributions
on the e¤ect of public spending shocks, we thus assume that the labour and goods markets
are perfectly competitive, that both nominal prices and wages are fully exible, that utility
is separable over time as well as over consumption and leisure at any point in time, that all
agents are utility-maximising, that there are no externalities associated with public spending,
and that taxes are lump sum. In particular, our results make clear that the pro-cyclical
responses of private consumption and wages after a scal expansion may naturally arise
from the non-Ricardian nature of the model alone, making other familiar imperfections, or
various possible combinations of them, unnecessary.4
Our model belongs to the growing literature on the consequences of market incomplete-
ness and borrowing constraints for scal policy outcomes. Woodford (1990) derived the op-
timal level of steady-state public debt in a deterministic model where liquidity-constrained
agents hold government bonds for precautionary purposes. This work was subsequently ex-
tended by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) to incorporate idiosyncratic uncertainty, and then
by Floden (2001) to take into account government transfers. Heathcote (2005) introduced
aggregate uncertainty about taxes into this framework, while our paper studies the e¤ects
of aggregate uncertainty about public spending (for the rst time, as far as we are aware.)
Methodologically, our paper is closest in spirit to Woodfords in that we construct a model
3This latter result is, of course, not inconsistent with some traditional Keynesian views about the e¤ec-
tiveness of scal policy (e.g., the textbook Keynesian crossmodel). It is, however, grounded on a very
di¤erent set of assumptions here.
4Recent scal policy models include Ravn et al. (2006), who assume imperfect competition together with
habit formation over individual varieties of the consumption good, Linnemann (2006), who assumes that
consumption and leisure are nonseparable while consumption is an inferior good, Linnemann and Shabert
(2003), who have imperfect competition and sticky nominal prices, and Gali et al. (2007), who combine
ad hoc hand to mouth households with imperfect competition and price rigidities in both goods and
labour markets. Papers analysing the e¤ects of distortionary taxation in the neoclassical growth model
include Ludvigson (1996) and Burnside et al. (2004), while Baxter and King (1993) consider the e¤ects of
government spending shocks when the latter generate external productivity e¤ects.
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that admits a closed-form solution wherein liquidity and wealth e¤ects can be disentangled
analytically. We are able to do so thanks to simplifying assumptions that limit agentshet-
erogeneity (despite the presence of uninsurable income shocks) and allow the behaviour of the
model to be summarised by a small-dimensional dynamic system; while our focus is on the
impact of public spending shocks here, the construction of a tractable general equilibrium
model with heterogenous agents may be of interest in other contexts. Finally, Angeletos
and Panousi (2007) recently analysed the e¤ect of changes in government spending in an
incomplete-market economy with idiosyncratic production risk. There are at least three im-
portant di¤erences between their work and ours. First, they study a Ricardian economy in
which there is no liquidity role for government bonds, while we precisely seek to understand
how the changes in liquidity supply induced by scal shocks may a¤ect aggregate outcomes.
Second, they focus on permanent spending shocks (i.e., changes in the size of the govern-
ment), whereas our analysis is chiey motivated by the recent empirical puzzles pertaining
to the e¤ect of transitory scal shocks. Third and foremost, in their model the wealth ef-
fects associated with higher (present and future) taxes lower rmslabour demand and lead,
under standard preferences, to a fall in both wages and private consumption. While such
supply-side e¤ects may arguably be at work after a permanent increase in public spending,
our purpose here is to understand when and why transitory spending shocks may generate
pro-cyclical private consumption, labour demand and wages.
Section 1 introduces our basic liquidity-constrained economy. Section 2 derives the im-
plications of debt-nanced increases in public spending shocks for the crowding-in of pri-
vate consumption. Section 3 introduces borrowing-constrained entrepreneurs, allowing us
to study the e¤ect of aggregate liquidity on labour demand and the real wage. Section 4
summarises our results and discusses their robustness.
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1 The model
The economy is populated by a government, as well as by a unit mass of innitely-lived
households and a large number of rms interacting in perfectly competitive goods and labour
markets. The technology and preferences of our baseline model are as in Scheinkman and
Weiss (1986): rms turn one unit of labour input, Lt, in one unit of the output good, Yt,
and households maximise:
Et
1X
j=0
j
 
u
 
cit+j
  lit+j ; (1)
where cit and l
i
t are the consumption demand and labour supply of household i at date t,
respectively,  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, and u(c) is a twice continuously
di¤erentiable utility function satisfying u0 (c) > 0; u0 (0) = 1, u00 (c) < 0. In addition, we
limit the curvature of u (:) by assuming that  (c)   cu00 (c) =u0 (c)  1.5 While our baseline
model implies constant equilibrium wages (= 1 since Yt = Lt), the production function will
be modied in Section 3 so as to allow for a liquidity-sensitive labour demand curve and
time-varying wages.
1.1 Households
Idiosyncratic income shocks are modelled as follows. The status of individual households in
the labour market randomly switches between employment (during which they freely choose
their labour supply) and unemployment (in which they are excluded from the labour market).
The individual labour-income uctuations that result are assumed to be entirely uninsurable
(i.e., agents cannot issue assets contingent on their future employment status, and there are
no unemployment benets). In addition, householdsasset wealth must be non-negative at
all times, so that households cannot use private borrowing and lending to insulate individual
consumption from idiosyncratic income uctuations. Given these restrictions, the only way
households can smooth consumption is by holding (riskless) government bonds. Household
5That  (c)  1 ensures that intertemporal substitution e¤ects in consumption do indeed dominate
intertemporal income e¤ects (given a linear disutility of labour), so that the steady-state rate of interest
increases with steady-state public debt.
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i thus faces the following budget and non-negativity constraints:
cit + a
i
t = a
i
t 1Rt 1 + 
i
tl
i
t   Tt; (2)
cit  0; lit  0; ait  0: (3)
In equation (2), ait denotes the total quantity of bonds held by household i at the end
of period t, Tt is a (possibly negative) lump-sum tax collected on all households at date
t, Rt 1 is the riskless gross interest rate on bonds from date t   1 to date t, and it is
an indicator variable taking on the value 1 if the household is employed at date t and
0 otherwise. Employed households have a constant probability  2 (0; 1) of falling into
unemployment in the next period, and unemployed households stay so for one period only:
Prob
 
it+1 = 1
 it = 1 =  and Prob  it+1 = 0 it = 0 = 0 (nothing substantial changes if
we allow the probability of moving out of unemployment to be less than one).
Since only employed households derive income from their labour supply, household i
chooses lit = 0 whenever 
i
t = 0: On the other hand, equations (1)(2) and the fact that the
real wage is 1 imply that the intratemporal optimality condition for employed households
(i.e., for whom it = 1) is l
i
t satisfying:
u0
 
ait 1Rt 1 + l
i
t   Tt   ait

= 1 (4)
On the other hand, since householdsasset holdings must be nonnegative, the intertem-
poral optimality condition for household i is:
u0
 
ait 1Rt 1 + 
i
tl
i
t   Tt   ait
  RtEtu0  aitRt + it+1lit+1   Tt+1   ait+1 it ; (5)
with (5) holding with strict inequality if the borrowing constraint is binding (and thus
ait = 0), and with equality otherwise (in which case a
i
t > 0).
In general, uninsurable income uncertainty of the kind assumed here generates a very
large number of household types, due to the dependence of current decisions on the house-
holds entire history of individual shocks, and the distribution of types must be approxi-
mated numerically (e.g., Aiyagari, 1994; Heathcote, 2005). Here we focus on a particular
equilibrium with a limited number of household types and a nite-state wealth distribution,
allowing us to derive the models dynamics in closed form. We construct this equilibrium
using a simple guess and verifymethod based on two conjectures, and then derive su¢ cient
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conditions for both conjectures to hold in equilibrium once all their behavioural and market-
clearing implications have been worked out. As stated in Proposition 1 further below, the
su¢ cient conditions for both conjectures to hold are that i) public debt trend-revert towards
a su¢ ciently low long-run target, and ii) deviations of public debt from target be of limited
magnitude.
The rst conjecture (C1) is that the borrowing constraint is always binding for unem-
ployed households. As such, unemployed households hold no government bonds at the end
of the current period (i.e., they would like to borrow, rather than save), so that we can write
from (2):
it = 0) cit = ait 1Rt 1   Tt; (6)
where ait 1 is household is bond holdings inherited from the previous period (when this
household was employed). The second conjecture (C2) is that the borrowing constraint is
never binding for employed households. From (1)(2), the intratemporal optimality condition
for any employed household i imposes that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption be equal to the real wage, so that we obtain:
it = 1) cit = u0 1(1)  ce: (7)
Any employed household stays employed in the next period with probability  and falls
into unemployment with probability 1 . ConjectureC2 implies that employed households
consumption-savings plans are interior (i.e., ait > 0 if 
i
t = 1) and, from (1), (6) and (7), that
these plans obey the following Euler equation:
1 = Rt +  (1  )RtEtu0(aitRt   Tt+1): (8)
The left-hand side of equation (8) is the current marginal utility of an employed house-
hold, u0(ce) = 1. The rst part of the right-hand side of (8) is the discounted utility of a
marginal unit of savings if the household stays employed in the next period (in which case
u0(cit+1) = u
0(ce) = 1), while the second part is the marginal utility of the same unit when the
household falls into unemployment in the next period (i.e., becomes unemployed, liquidates
assets and, from equation (6), enjoys marginal utility u0(cit+1) = u
0(aitRt   Tt+1)).
In equation (8), household is current asset demand only depends on aggregate variables
(Rt and Tt+1). The solution ait to (8) is thus identical across employed households and we
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can write:
it = 1) ait = at (> 0): (9)
Equations (6) and (9) imply that all unemployed households (labelled u-households
from now on) have identical consumption levels, so that their budget constraint becomes:
u : cut = at 1Rt 1   Tt: (10)
Employed households can be of two di¤erent types, depending on whether they were
employed or not in the previous period. Call the former ee-householdsand the latter ue-
households. In the current period, ue-households consume ce and save at but enjoy no asset
payo¤ (since they were borrowing-constrained at date t  1 and thus chose ait 1 = 0). Then,
equations (2), (7) and (9) yield the labour supply of ue-households, luet (which is homogenous
across such households) as the residual of the following equation:
ue : ce + at = l
ue
t   Tt: (11)
On the other hand, ee-households consume ce, save at, and enjoy the asset payo¤at 1Rt 1.
This also uniquely denes their labour supply, leet ; through the following equation:
ee : ce + at = at 1Rt 1 + leet   Tt: (12)
To summarise, C1 and C2 imply that households can be of three di¤erent types only
(with budget constraints (10)(12)), while the equilibrium wealth distribution is two-state
(i.e., ait = at > 0 or 0). Note that it is almost sure, asymptotically, that any two ran-
domly chosen households have di¤erent individual income histories, due to the idiosyncratic
nature of unemployment shocks. Nevertheless, under our conjectures householdshetero-
geneity is limited by the fact that only last periods an current idiosyncratic shocks matter
in determining householdstypes. This is because, under C1 and C2, i) households falling
into unemployment liquidate their asset wealth entirely, and ii) agents falling out of unem-
ployment adjust labour supply so as to reach their target level of precautionary savings, at
instantaneously.6
6Of course, in reality individual asset depletion and repletion following changes in labour income are
gradual rather than immediate. Our focus on a tractable analysis of aggregate scal shocks under incomplete
markets and agentsheterogeneity requires that we abstract from this inertia in individual asset adjustments.
Of course, the individual wealth target itself, at; will vary over time following changes in public spending.
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Given the assumed probabilities of changing employment status, the invariant proportions
of u-, ee- and ue-households are 
  (1  ) = (2  ), 1  2
 and 
, respectively (i.e., the
proportion of employed households is 1  2
 + 
 = 1  
). For simplicity, we assume that
the proportion of each type of household is at the invariant distribution level from t = 0
onwards.
1.2 Government
Let Gt and Tt denote government consumption and lump-sum taxes during period t, respec-
tively, and Bt the stock of public debt at the end of period t. The government faces the
budget constraint:
Bt 1Rt 1 +Gt = Bt + Tt: (13)
In equation (13), we think of transitory variations in Gt as being exogenously chosen
by the government, of Bt as adjusting endogenously over time depending on the primary
decit and the equilibrium interest rate, and of Tt as obeying a scal rule with feedback from
macroeconomic and/or scal variables. Following the observation by Bohn (1998) that the
US debt-GDP ratio is stationary, we restrict our attention to rules ensuring that public debt
reverts towards its (exogenous) long-run target B at least asymptotically. Such rules, which
exclude Ponzi schemes, are consistent a wide variety of feedback mechanisms, including that
from public debt to primary decit as in Bohn (1998), from output and debt to structural
decits (e.g., Gali and Perotti, 2003), as well as from public debt and public spending to
taxes (e.g., Gali et al., 2007). Loosely speaking, stationarity requires that the tax feedback
be su¢ ciently strong never to allow public debt to drift away from target forever; in Section
2 we illustrate the dynamic e¤ects of spending shocks under one of the simplest rules of this
class, whereby tax revenues only react to deviations of public debt from its long-run (i.e.,
steady-state) target.
1.3 Market clearing
In our economy, only employed households hold government bonds. Given the asymptotic
distribution of household types, the clearing of the bond, labour and goods markets requires,
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respectively:
(1  
) at = Bt; (14)
(1  2
) leet + 
luet = Lt; (15)
(1  
) ce + 
cut +Gt = Yt: (16)
Substituting (7), (13) and (14) into the Euler equation (8), we may write the relation
between the interest rate and scal variables as follows:
Rt ( + (1  )Etu0 ((2  ) (Bt+1  Gt+1 + 
Tt+1))) = 1 (17)
Note that as  ! 1 idiosyncratic uncertainty about labour income vanishes; the model
then behaves like a Ricardian one and Rt ! 1=, the gross rate of time preference.
A three-household type equilibrium is dened as sequences of individual consumption
levels, fce; cut g1t=0, individual labour supplies, fleet ; luet g1t=0, individual bond holdings, fatg1t=0,
and aggregate variables, fLt; Yt; Btg1t=0 such that the optimality conditions (7)(12) and the
market clearing conditions (14)(16) hold in every period, given the forcing sequence fGtg1t=0
and a scal rule for fTtg1t=0 that ensures the stationarity of public debt. We may now state
the following existence proposition (the proof is found in Appendix A).
Proposition 1. Provided that public debt is stationary and that uctuations around the
steady state are small, then the three-household type equilibrium exists if and only if B 2
(0; B), where B = u0 1 (1) = (1   + ) > 0. Along this equilibrium, Rt < 1= for all t.
In short, Proposition 1 indicates that our economy is liquidity-constrained if public debt
is su¢ ciently low, in which case the equilibrium interest rate is also low (relative to that
prevailing in an unconstrained economy) due to the precautionary demand for government
bonds.7 From now on we proceed under the maintained assumption that liquidity is scarce
(in the sense that B 2 (0; B)), and defer until the last Section the discussion of the sig-
nicance of this assumption. Of course, the specic parameter restrictions imposed by the
requirement that public debt be stationary depend on the particular scal rule followed by
the government.
7These properties essentially parallel those obtained by Woodford (1990) with a liquidity-constrained
economy where both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainties are shut down.
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2 Liquidity and wealth e¤ects of scal expansions
2.1 Aggregate and individual variables
In this section we start by showing how liquidity and wealth e¤ects compete in determining
the overall response of aggregate- and individual-level variables to public-spending shocks,
and then illustrate the implied dynamic e¤ects of such shocks under a simple scal rule.
Total consumption by employed households is (1  
) ce, while the total consumption
of unemployed households is 
cut . Then, using (10), (13) and (14) and rearranging, total
private consumption and total output can be respectively written as:
Ct = (1  
) ce + (1  ) (Bt  Gt + 
Tt) ; (18)
Yt = (1  
) ce + (1  ) (Bt + 
Tt) + Gt: (19)
These static, reduced-form equations provide a rst insight into how liquidity e¤ects alter
the transmission of scal shock relative to that at work in the Ricardian model. Imagine rst
the e¤ect of a rise in public spending entirely nanced by public debt, the implied increase
in taxes necessary to satisfy the governments intertemporal budget constraint being left to
some future periods. Private consumption does not change on impact since Tt = 0 and
thus Bt   Gt = 0. However, the implied rapid growth of public debt and the delayed
response of taxes may cause the quantity Bt Gt+
Tt in (18) to be greater than zero over a
sustained period of time starting at date t+1, thereby leading to a persistent crowding-in of
private consumption by public consumption. Alternatively, consider the textbook Ricardian
experiment of a debt-nanced cut in lump-sum taxes, nanced by future tax increases, with
the entire path of government consumption remaining unchanged. Since Gt = 0 and thus
Bt =  Tt by assumption, we have (Bt + 
Tt) > 0 so that the cut raises private
consumption and output on impact (recall that this experiment would be neutral under
Ricardian equivalence). Finally, notice that changes in taxes and public spending that keep
the primary decit at zero (that is, Gt = Tt and Bt = 0) a¤ect private consumption
and output in exactly the way predicted by the Ricardian model (i.e., Ct < 0, Yt > 0):
variations in the stock of public debt are thus crucial in generating the expansionary e¤ects
of scal shocks.
To obtain further insight into the underlying workings of these non-Ricardian e¤ects,
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we need to go beyond the reduced-form equations (18)(19) and look at household-level
variables, which describe how individual consumption (i.e. the private demand side of the
model) and labour supply (the supply side of the model) respond to scal shocks. The
consumption of employed households, ce, is not a¤ected by scal shocks. Now, substitute
(14) into (10) to write cut as follows:
cut = (2  )Bt 1Rt 1   Tt: (20)
In equation (20), higher taxes lower consumption, but higher public debt raises the
overall liquidation value of u-householdsportfolios (i.e., the (2  )Bt 1Rt 1 term in (20)).
Provided that the increase in public debt also persistently raises the interest rate after the
spending shock (which, from (17), occurs whenever Bt   Gt + 
Tt rises over time), the
right-hand side of (20) may increase. Ultimately, whether cut (and thus Ct) rises or falls thus
depends on whether the liquidity e¤ects of public debt on u-householdsportfolios dominate
the wealth e¤ects of taxes following the shock.
Turning to the supply side of the model, we can substitute (7) and (14) into (11)(12)
and write labour supply by employed households as follows:
leet = c
e + (2  ) (Bt  Bt 1Rt 1) + Tt; (21)
luet = c
e + (2  )Bt + Tt: (22)
Equations (21)(22) show that labour supply responds to both taxes (as in the Ricardian
model) and the stock of liquidity that households acquire as self-insurance against unem-
ployment risk. ue-households, who have just moved out of unemployment and have zero
beginning-of-period wealth, will seize any extra opportunity to save by raising labour sup-
ply; ee-households, who are partly self-insured when they enter the current period, adjust
their labour supply depending on the new stock of government bonds available for purchase
relative to the current value of their previously-accumulated portfolio. In both cases, the
growth of public debt that may result from higher public spending generates liquidity e¤ects
that strengthen the wealth e¤ects on labour supply.
2.2 The dynamic e¤ects of spending shocks
Having discussed how liquidity e¤ects may a¤ect the response of our variables of interest to
scal expansions, we now illustrate the dynamics of the model in the context of a specic
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example of a scal rule and a shock process. The tax rule and shock process that we consider
are as follows:
Tt = T +  (Bt  B) ; (23)
Gt =  Gt 1 + t; (24)
where T denotes steady-state taxes, B steady-state public debt (i.e., the long run target),
 > 0 and  2 (0; 1) are constant parameters, and t is a innovation to public spending. Note
that the qualitative properties of the model are robust to the inclusion of other feedbacks in
(23) (e.g., from Gt to Tt), as well as to a lagged (rather than simultaneous) reaction of taxes
to public debt; what matters for our results is the possibility that public spending shocks
entail signicant variations in the stock of public debt, at least in the short run.
The policy parameter  in equation (23) e¤ectively indexes the way in which scal ex-
pansions are nanced at various horizons. If  is large, taxes rise quickly following a scal
expansion and public debt plays a relatively minor rôle in their short-run nancing. Smaller
values of , on the contrary, imply a muted short-run response of taxes and a more substan-
tial rôle for public debt issuance in the short run; the ensuing rise in the stock of public debt
then eventually triggers a rise in taxes in the medium run until the reversion of the public
debt has been completed. In the context of (23), stationarity simply requires that  be not
too small see equation (26) below. Finally, the assumption that steady-state government
consumption is zero in equation (24) is made for expositional clarity and entails no loss
of generality; here it implies that in the steady state tax revenues just cover interest rate
payments on debt, i.e., T = B (R  1).8
Under (23)(24), the dynamics of public debt can be approximated by the following
process (see Appendix A for details):
Bt = (1  a)B + aBt 1 + bGt + cGt 1; (25)
where Gt is given by (24), a > 0, b > 0, c < 0 are constants that depend on the deep
parameters of the model and the target debt level B, and where @a=@ < 0 (i.e., a stronger
8The non-Ricardian nature of the model implies that R  1 may be negative if steady-state public debt,
B, is su¢ ciently low. In this case, the steady state tax collection becomes a positive transfer of amount  T
(the bounds on R and the relation between R and B are detailed in Appendix A.)
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tax reaction speeds up the reversion of public debt towards target). Finally, equations (13)
and (18)(19) give the equilibrium values of Rt, Ct and Yt as functions of the endogenous
state Bt and the forcing term Gt.
Since a > 0, stationarity of public debt requires that a < 1. As is shown in Appendix A,
this condition is equivalent to:
 > min  R  1 + (2  ) 
1  (1  )  ; with  
(1  R) (cu)R
1 + (1  )R > 0; (26)
and where 1  (1  )  > 0 and R > 0 is uniquely dened by the target debt level B.
To illustrate the dynamic impact of liquidity and wealth e¤ects in our economy, we
draw impulse-response functions for all relevant variables using equation (25) together with
(13), (18)(19) and (23)-(24). We use the (quarterly) parameters  = 0:98,  = 0:94 (this
generates an unemployment rate of 
 ' 5:66%),  = 0:95, the (unique) value of B such that
R = 1:01, and u (c) = ln c:
Figure 1 displays the responses of our variables of interest to a public-spending shock,
when  = 0:2 (the solid line) and  = 1:2 (the dotted line). It is useful to compare the debt
dynamics implied by both tax rule parameters. Equation (25) gives:
 = 0:2 : Bt = 0:105B + 0:895Bt 1 + 0:833Gt   0:009Gt 1;
 = 1:2 : Bt = 0:525B + 0:475Bt 1 + 0:454Gt   0:016Gt 1:
The case where  = 0:2 illustrates a situation where liquidity e¤ects dominate wealth
e¤ects on total private consumption (except at the very moment of the shock), due to
the substantial increase in public debt and the implied improvement in households self-
insurance opportunities (note that private consumption tracks public debt, and is thus far
more persistent than the shock itself.). As a result, the output e¤ect of a spending shock
is large, in the sense that the spending multiplier is greater than one almost all along the
adjustment path.
In contrast, wealth e¤ects dominate when  = 1:2, due to the limited increase in public
debt and the rapid reaction of taxes, resulting in a Ricardian(i.e., negative) response of
private consumption all along the transition path; in consequence, the government spending
multiplier is always lower than one.
15
Holding other parameters constant, a sensitivity analysis indicates that values of  be-
tween 0:2 and 1:2 cause private consumption to start falling below its steady-state level for
several periods (during which public debt and implied liquidity e¤ects are still limited), and
then rise above its steady-state level for the rest of the adjustment period (after public debt
has risen enough to make the liquidity e¤ects prevalent). Since estimates of the response of
taxes or the primary decit to public debt in U.S. post-war data indicate a slow reversion of
public debt and a value of  closer to 0:2 than to 1:2 (see Bohn, 1998, and Gali et al., 2007),
plausible values of  favour the dominance of liquidity e¤ects here, at least over part of the
adjustment path.
Figure 1. The basic model. The panels display the linear deviations from the steady state of
public debt (B), taxes (T ), private consumption (C), output (Y ) and the interest rate (R) following
a public spending shock (G) of 5% of steady-state output. The scal rule is Tt = (Bt B), with
 = 0:2 (solid line) and  = 1:2 (dotted line).
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3 Liquidity e¤ects on labour demand
Our analysis has thus far focused on the way in which liquidity e¤ects may a¤ect the labour
supply and consumption demand of private agents, leaving aside their potential e¤ects on
labour demand and the equilibrium real wage. A natural way of introducing labour demand
shifts into the basic model is to think of output as being produced by entrepreneurs, that is
households having access to a production technology, rather than by a separate rm sector.
Higher liquidity may then also relax the borrowing constraints faced by these entrepreneurs
and raise their labour demand following a scal expansion. Here again, whether the real
wage consequently rises or falls depends on whether the liquidity e¤ects on labour demand
dominate the wealth e¤ects on labour supply following the shock.
Our entrepreneurial model is exactly the same as that in Section 2 except for one feature:
employed households now have a constant probability 1    of becoming entrepreneurs for
exactly one period. Entrepreneurs have access to a production technology that yields yit+1
units of goods at date t + 1 for lf;it units of labour hired at date t (entrepreneurs do not
supply labour). The households objective is (1) as before, and we further assume here that
u(c) =  ln c,  > 0. The budget constraint of household i is now:
cit + a
i
t +
 
1  it

wtl
f;i
t = a
i
t 1Rt 1 + 
i
twtl
i
t + y
i
t   Tt; (27)
where it = 1 if the household is employed at date t and 
i
t = 0 if the household runs a rm.
Consider rst the choice of an employed household. From (1) and (27), the latter chooses
the level of labour supply lit that satises:
u0
 
ait 1Rt 1 + wtl
i
t + y
i
t   Tt   ait

= 1: (28)
On the other hand, employed households stay employed in the next period with probabil-
ity  and become entrepreneurs with complementary probability. The optimal asset demand
of an employed household i, ait, must thus satisfy:
u0
 
ait 1Rt 1 + wtl
i
t + y
i
t   Tt   ait
  RtEtu0  aitRt + wt+1lit+1   Tt+1   ait+1
+ (1  ) RtEtu0(aitRt   Tt+1   ait+1   wt+1lf;it+1); (29)
with this expression holding with strict inequality if the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e.,
ait = 0), but holding with equality otherwise (i.e., a
i
t > 0).
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Let us now turn to entrepreneurs. Their running of a rm prevents them from earning
any wage income, so for them wtlit = 0. Since they were employed in the previous period
they earn no production output, i.e., yit = 0. Then, from (1) and (27), their optimal choices
of labour demand, lf;it , and asset demand, a
i
t, must satisfy, respectively,
u0(ait 1Rt 1   Tt   ait   wtlf;it ) = w 1t Etu0(aitRt + wt+1lit+1 + lf;it   Tt+1   ait+1); (30)
u0(ait 1Rt 1   Tt   ait   wtlf;it )  RtEtu0(aitRt + wt+1lit+1 + lf;it   Tt+1   ait+1); (31)
with the latter inequality holding strictly if the entrepreneur is borrowing-constrained and
with equality otherwise.
Just as in Section 1, an equilibrium with a limited number of household type/asset states
can be constructed by conjecturing that employed households are never constrained (i.e., they
wish to save rather than borrow, so (29) holds with equality) while entrepreneurs always are
(i.e., they would like to expand employment and production through borrowing but cannot
do so, implying that (31) holds with strict inequality). For the sake of conciseness, we just
describe the properties of this equilibrium here and then establish the su¢ cient conditions
for its existence in Proposition 2 below.
The three types of households of the entrepreneurial model are: i) entrepreneurs (or
f households), who are currently borrowing-constrained and were employed in the previous
period; ii) ee households, who are currently employed after having been employed in the
previous period; and iii) fe households, who are currently employed after having been
entrepreneurs in the previous period. Just as before, employed households are not borrowing-
constrained and all choose the same consumption and asset holding levels, denoted by cet and
at (cet will be time-varying here, due to changes in the real wage). We denote by c
f
t and l
f
t
entrepreneurs consumption and labour demands, respectively. The budget constraint of
each type of household is now:
ee : cet + at = at 1Rt 1 + wtl
ee
t   Tt; (32)
fe : cet + at = wtl
fe
t + l
f
t 1   Tt; (33)
f : cft + wtl
f
t = at 1Rt 1   Tt: (34)
Equation (32) is the same as (12), except for the fact that the consumption of employed
households, cet ; is time-varying. In equation (33), fe-households earn labour income wtl
fe
t
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plus production output yt = l
f
t 1; and this total income is used to pay for consumption, asset
accumulation and taxes. Equation (34), the budget constraint of entrepreneurs, states that
they entirely liquidate their stock of assets to nance consumption, taxes, and the wage bill
wtl
f
t (i.e., they hold no bonds at the end of the period since they face binding borrowing
constraints). From (28)(29) and (32)(34), the intratemporal and intertemporal optimality
conditions of employed households are now, respectively:
wtu
0 (cet) = 1; (35)
u0 (cet) = RtEt(u
0  cet+1+ (1  )u0(cft+1)): (36)
From (34), entrepreneurs must allocate their after-tax income, at 1Rt 1   Tt, to current
consumption, cft , and the wage bill, wtl
f
t , taking the real wage as given. From (30) and (34),
together with the fact that entrepreneurs stay so for one period only, the solution to the
entrepreneurs optimal labour demand, lft , must satisfy:
wtu
0(cft ) = Etu
0  cet+1 : (37)
The optimality condition (37) simply sets equal the utility fall implied by a decrease in
current consumption necessary to hire an extra unit of labour to the utility gain that is
expected from increasing current labour input (and thus future production) by that unit.
The market-clearing equations of the entrepreneurial model are as follows. Clearing of
the market for bonds is given by equation (14) as before. Given that entrepreneurs are in
proportion 
; clearing of the labour and goods markets now requires:
(1  2
) leet + 
lfet = 
lft ; (38)
(1  
) cet + 
cft +Gt = 
yt: (39)
Finally, the governments behaviour is described by the budget constraint (13), together
with our scal rule and shock process (23)(24), where again  must be large enough for
public debt to be stationary.
A three-household type equilibrium of the entrepreneurial model is dened as sequences of
individual consumption levels, fcet ; cft g1t=0, individual labour supplies, fleet ; lfet g1t=0, individual
bond and labour demands, fat; lft g1t=0, and aggregate variables, f
lft ;
yt; Btg1t=0 such that
i) only entrepreneurs face binding borrowing constraints and ii) the optimality conditions
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(35)(37) and the market clearing conditions (14) and (38)(39) hold in every period, given
the forcing sequence fGtg1t=0 and a scal rule for fTtg1t=0 ensuring the stationarity of public
debt. Proposition 2, whose proof is found in Appendix B, states the conditions under which
such an equilibrium exist.
Proposition 2. Provided that public debt is stationary and that uctuations around the
steady state are small, then the three-household type equilibrium of the entrepreneurial
model exists if and only if B 2 (0; B), where B = 2( ( + 1  ) 1 + (1  ) 1):
Along this equilibrium, Rt < 1= for all t.
The dynamic system characterising the entrepreneurial model involves more lags and
more interactions between variables than the basic model, making it di¢ cult to compare
directly the outcomes of the two specications (the equations forming this dynamic system
are described in Appendix B). For the sake of comparability, we run policy experiments with
exactly the same parameter values as in the previous Section, except for  which is now set
to 0.80 (this implies a share of entrepreneurs of 
 ' 17%).9 Although the dynamics of the
entrepreneurial model cannot be reduced to a single stochastic di¤erence equation, it yields
an expectational dynamic system that can be solved numerically for the vector of relevant
variables and for the stationarity condition (the procedure is summarised in Appendix B).
Figure 2 displays the responses of scal and aggregate variables to a public-spending shock
generated by the entrepreneurial model (note that cet and l
f
t , although not represented, are
tracked by wt and Yt+1, respectively). Since liquidity e¤ects on labour demand take one
period to be operative (as some employed households having increased their savings turn
into entrepreneurs), wealth e¤ects on labour supply dominate on impact whether  = 0:2
or 1:2. The ensuing increase in labour supply leads to a sharp fall in the real wage and the
consumption of employed households, causing total private consumption to fall. However,
when  = 0:2 liquidity e¤ects on labour demand become dominant (in the sense of leading
to higher-than-steady-state wages) for the entire adjustment path starting from one period
after the shock, leading to a persistent boom in private consumption.
9Our empirical counterpart to the share of entrepreneurs is the number of U.S. rms, from The Census
Bureaus 2002 Survey of Business Owners (23 million rms) divided by total employment by the end of the
same year from the BLS Current Population Survey (136.5 millon people).
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The responses of consumption and output are qualitatively similar to those in the basic
model when  = 1:2 (except for the initial wiggle due to the production delay), but labour-
market adjustments matter here: the strong reaction of taxes and limited growth of public
both act to weaken the liquidity e¤ects on labour demand whilst strengthening the wealth
e¤ects on labour supply. This naturally leads to a limited increase in labour demand relative
to the contemporaneous increase in labour supply, and thus to a fall in the real wage and a
crowding-out of private consumption by public spending. Just as in the basic model, inter-
mediate values of  (not represented here) generate a more mixed picture with dominance
of either e¤ect at di¤erent points on the transition path.
Figure 2. The entrepreneurial model. The panels display the linear deviations from
the steady state of public debt (B), taxes (T ), private consumption (C), output (Y ) and the real
wage (w) following a public spending shock (G) of 5% of steady-state output. The scal rule is
Tt = (Bt B), with  = 0:2 (solid line) and  = 1:2 (dotted line).
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4 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented the predictions of a liquidity-constrained economy regarding the
e¤ects of debt-nanced increases in public spending, with particular attention being paid
to the e¤ects of such shocks on private consumption and the real wage. Our main goal is
to illustrate that the liquidity e¤ects induced by temporary changes in the stock of public
debt can drastically alter the predictions of the baseline Ricardian model, where changes
in public spending a¤ect aggregates only through intertemporal wealth e¤ects. The view
that the decit nancing of public spending can generate large multiplier e¤ects, thanks
to consumption crowding-in and possibly pro-cyclical wages, is often associated with the
Keynesian tradition in macroeconomics; our analysis shows that such e¤ects are consistent
with a set of assumptions (i.e., incomplete markets and borrowing constraints) that di¤er
from typical Keynesian ones (e.g., sticky prices, imperfect competition).
We explore the implications of scarce liquidity for the transmission of scal shocks using
a stylised model that admits a closed-form solution with limited agent heterogeneity and a
limited number of assets. It is thus natural to wonder whether our results would still hold
in a model with more types of agents and more types of liquid assets.
Our closed-form equilibrium results from the joint property that employed households
reach their target level of precautionary wealth instantaneously (an outcome of linear labour
disutility), while unemployed households or entrepreneursface a binding borrowing con-
straint and liquidate their asset portfolio from the very moment that their income falls. In a
more general model with lower labour supply elasticity and slower asset liquidation, house-
holds would deplete or replete assets only gradually rather than in one go (e.g., Aiyagari and
McGrattan, 1998; Heathcote, 2005), and the reactions of labour supply and consumption
demand to changes in aggregate liquidity would be smoother. However, the same liquid-
ity e¤ects of public debt would be at work (provided that agents are e¤ectively liquidity-
constrained), resulting in non-Ricardian e¤ects of spending shocks on private consumption,
employment and wages.
Finally, models of liquidity-constrained economies all rely on the assumption that liquid-
ity is too scarce to allow for full self-insurance, so that the decentralised outcome is socially
ine¢ cient (i.e., relative to that which would be chosen by an almighty social planner). While
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our model is no exception, this assumption may raise two questions here. First, are there
no other means of self-insurance, like privately-issued debt instruments (inside liquidity),
or claims to the capital stock, that may eliminate the need for government-issued liquidity?
Second, even if the private supply of liquidity is too low, why should public debt itself be
too low while it may be Pareto-improving to increase its stock until full self-insurance is
permitted?
In our view, previous analyses provide at least partial answers to both questions. First,
the supply of inside liquidity is limited by the very presence of nancial constraints, and is
thus likely to be in insu¢ cient quantity in equilibrium (e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 1998;
Farhi and Tirole, 2008); on the other hand, nothing guarantees that capital can provide
enough liquidity in the steady state to mimic rst-best outcomes, and capital investment can
itself be limited by previously accumulated liquidity (Woodford, 1990).10 Second, if public
debt includes a distortionary component (as in Floden, 2001) or crowds out capital (as in
Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998), then increasing the public debt above a certain threshold
may turn out to decrease, rather than increase, aggregate welfare; in this situation, the
long-run level of public debt may endogenously be set by a benevolent government at a level
where liquidity constraints still matter.
10In our model, inside liquidity can coexist with outside liquidity if the upper debt limit that households
face is di¤erent from zero; our results continue to hold in this case, provided that the debt limit is su¢ ciently
tight for the relevant households (i.e., unemployed households or entrepreneurs) to be borrowing-constrained
in equilibrium. Similarly, it can be checked numerically that our results are robust to the inclusion of
endogenous capital accumulation either by liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs, or by unconstrained, outside
rms (provided, in the latter case, that steady-state capital is su¢ ciently small.)
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Appendix A: The basic model
Proof of Proposition 1
If uctuations around the steady state are su¢ ciently small, then C1 and C2 hold in every
period provided that they hold in the steady state. (14) implies that at > 0 if and only if
Bt > 0, so C2 holds in the steady state if and only if B > 0. On the other hand, C1 holds in
the steady state if and only if u0 (cu) > Ru0 (ce). From (7) and (10) we have u0 (ce) = 1 and
cu = aR   T , so the latter inequality may be written as u0 (aR  T ) > R: Now, rewriting
the steady-state counterpart of (8) as
u0 (cu) = u0   (aR  T ) = (1  R) = (R (1  )) ; (A1)
we nd that the condition u0 (cu) > Ru0 (ce) is equivalent to R < 1=.
We now show that R < 1= if and only if B < B. This can be shown by rst establishing
that B is a continuous, strictly increasing function of R over the appropriate interval, and
then by evaluating the function B (R) at the point R = 1= to nd B. R is given by (17).
By assumption G = 0, implying that T = B(R   1). Thus, after some manipulations the
steady-state counterpart of (17) can be written as:
B =
1
1 + (1  )Ru
0 1
 
(R) 1   
1  
!
 B (R) ; (A2)
where B (R) is positive and continuous over (0; 1=). First, compute:
B0 (R) =
  (1  )
(1 + (1  )R)2  u
0 1
 
(R) 1   
1  
!
+
1
1 + (1  )R 
@
@R
u0 1
 
(R) 1   
1  
!
(A1) implies that u0(cu (R)) = ((R) 1 )= (1  ) ; so the @u0 1 (:) =@R term above is:
@
@R
u0 1
 
(R) 1   
1  
!
=
1
u00 (cu)
 @u
0 (cu)
@R
=
1
u00 (cu)
  1
(1  ) R2 :
After rearranging, this allows us to rewrite B0 (R) as follows:
B0 (R) =
  (1  ) cu
(1 + (1  )R)2 +
 R 2
 (1  ) (1 + (1  )R)
1
u00 (cu)
=
(1  )u0(cu)
(1 + (1  )R)2 u00 (cu)

 (cu)  1=R + 1  
(1  ) (1  R)

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The term inside brackets must be negative for B0 (R) to be positive. Since  (c)  1 by as-
sumption, a su¢ cient condition for this is that (1=R + 1  ) = (1  ) (1  R) > 1, which
is always true. Thus, B (R) is continuous and strictly increasing in over (0; 1=), while
limR!0B = u0 1 (1) (= 0 by assumption) and limR!1= B = u0 1 (0) = ( + 1  )
( 1). Then, setting R = 1= in (A2) gives B. Note also from (A2) that R < 1 if
B < (2  ) 1 u0 1 ( 1   = (1  )).
Dynamics and stability
We use hatted variables to denote level-deviations from steady state (i.e., X^t = Xt   X).
First, substitute (23)(24) into the linearised versions of (13) and (17) to obtain:
B^t =

B
1 + 

R^t 1 +

R
1 + 

B^t 1 +

1
1 + 

Gt (A3)
 R2 (1  ) (2  )u00 (cu)

(1 + 
)Et(B^t+1)   Gt

= R^t (A4)
Let us rewrite (A4) as follows, making use of (A1)(A2) and the denition of  in (26):
(2  ) 
B

(1 + 
)Et(B^t+1)   Gt

= R^t (A5)
Leading (A3) one period and taking expectations, solving (A5) for Et(B^t+1), and then
equating the two expressions, we obtain:
RB^t +  

1  1 + 
1 + 


Gt = B

1 + 
(2  )  (1 + 
)   1

R^t
Now, lagging the latter equation one period, solving it for R^t 1 and substituting the
resulting expression into (A3), one nds equation (25) with coe¢ cients:
a =
R
1 +   (2  )  (1 + 
) ; b =
1
1 + 
; c =   a 
R (1 + )
;
where R is uniquely dened by B from (A2) and the fact that B0(R) > 0 (see the proof of
Proposition 1.)
The sign of a is related to the stationarity requirement that jaj < 1: If a > 0, then a
necessary and su¢ cient condition for stationarity is (26) in the body of the paper, given that

 = (1  ) = (2  ),  2 (0; 1] and 1   (1  )  > 0. If, on the contrary, a < 0, then the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for stationarity is  < ( 1 R + (2  )) =1  (1  ) ;
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but the right hand side of this inequality is negative. Since this is inconsistent with  > 0,
it must be the case that (26) hold, which in turns implies that a > 0. By implication c < 0,
and obviously b > 0 since  > 0. Finally, with a > 0 we have that @a=@' < 0.
Appendix B: The entrepreneurial model
Proof of Proposition 2
Wemust rst derive the dynamic system characterising the entrepreneurial equilibrium under
the joint conjecture that entrepreneurs are always borrowing-constrained while employed
households never are, and then derive from the steady-state relations the range of debt
levels compatible with this joint conjecture. With u (c) =  ln c, equations (35) and (37)
give:
cet = wt; c
f
t = wt=(Et
 
w 1t+1

) (B1)
Substituting (B1) into (39), the goods-market equilibrium can be written as:
wt + (1  ) wt=(Et
 
w 1t+1

) + (2  )Gt = (1  ) lft 1: (B2)
Substituting (13), (14) and (B1) into the budget constraint of f -households, (34), gives:
wt=(Et
 
w 1t+1

) + wtl
f
t = (2  ) (Bt  Gt + 
Tt) : (B3)
Finally, substituting (B1) into (36), the Euler equations for employed households is:
w 1t = Rt
 
Et
 
w 1t+1

+ (1  )Et
 
w 1t+1Et+1
 
w 1t+2

(B4)
Since shocks are small by assumption, the dynamic system just derived is an equilibrium
if, in the steady state, i) all employed households hold positive assets at the end of the
current period (which, from (14), is ensured by B > 0), and ii) entrepreneurs are always
borrowing-constrained, i.e., u0(cf ) > Ru0 (ce). From (B1), this latter condition is equivalent
to wR < 1. Now, the steady state counterpart of (B4) gives:
w = 2 (1  )R= (1  R) (B5)
Substituting (B5) into the inequality wR < 1, we nd that entrepreneurs are borrowing-
constrained if, and only if, R < 1=. We may now compute B; the unique upper debt
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level ensuring that R 2 (0; 1=) whenever B 2 (0; B). First, use the facts that G = 0 and
T = B (R  1) to write the steady-state counterparts of (B2) and (B3) as follows:
w= (1  ) + w2= = lf
lf = B (1 + (1  )R) =w   w=
Equating the two and using (B5), we can write steady-state public debt as:
B (R) =
R
1=R + 1  

2 (1  )
1  R
2
1
1   +
1

+
 (1  )R
1  R

(B6)
B (R) is continuous and increasing inR over [0; 1=) ; whileB (0) = 0 and limR!1= B =
1. This uniquely denes B = B (1=) in Proposition 2.
Dynamics and stability
The dynamic system characterising the behaviour of the entrepreneurial model is derived as
follows. First, substitute the linear counterparts of (23) and (B1) and into the linearised ver-
sions of (13) and (B2)(B4). The latter equations then form a four-dimensional expectational
dynamic system with forcing term Gt and vector of unknowns:
Xt =
h
Bt l
f
t Rt wt
i0
This system can be solved numerically for its auto-regressive representation using stan-
dard methods once values have been assigned to all deep parameters of the model and to the
target debt level B (here again the latter is chosen so as to generates a steady state value of
R of 1.01, but equation (B6) rather than (A2), is used). Finally, total private consumption
is Ct = (1  
) cet + 
cft , with cet and cft given by (B1), and aggregate output is Yt = 
lft 1.
For the chosen parameter conguration, the stationarity requirement becomes:
 > min ' 0:134;
and is thus satised for both  = 0:2 and  = 1:2.
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